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The 2006 US Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act gave the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) new authority to fund the development and procurement of medical
countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The
legislation builds on the authority the HHS gained in 2004 under Project BioShield, which
established a fund to procure medical countermeasures. This article reviews the new HHS
authorities and the improvements on BioShield, and it describes some of the challenges HHS will
face in exercising the new authorities to fund the development and procurement of medical
countermeasures against CBRN threats.
Introduction
Improvements were necessary: the original Project BioShield
1
proved to be insufficient to meet the needs of the govern-
ment for acquiring medical countermeasures for the Strate-
gic National Stockpile. BioShield could not be used to fund
advanced development of medical countermeasures because
of strict provisions in the legislation, so technologies
and products that might be of interest to the government
could not be shepherded through development to maturity,
when they could be stockpiled. Biopharmaceutical compa-
nies were also less likely or able to fund the advanced
development of potential countermeasures themselves,
unwilling to take the considerable financial risk that their
products would fail in development or not be procured by
BioShield even if the products were successful. Some
companies, mostly smaller biotechnology companies,
pursued products with hopes of a BioShield procurement
contract in spite of the risks. In general, however, large
biopharmaceutical companies were uninterested in entering
an uncertain, risky market where the US government would
be their sole customer.
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
2 sought
to correct the shortcomings in Project BioShield by allowing
for funding of advanced development of products under a
new contracting mechanism called the Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority (BARDA). The legisla-
tion also modified Project BioShield so that milestone
payments could be made to companies, without the need
for companies to repay the funding to the government if the
product fails or the contract is canceled.
Project BioShield
After the anthrax attacks in 2001, there was broad concern
that the US lacked vaccines and therapeutics against
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
threats. To address this, President Bush announced the
creation of Project BioShield in his State of the Union
address on 28 January 2003,
3 and the Project BioShield Act
was signed into law on 21 July 2004.
4 The Act created a
Special Reserve Fund for use in procuring countermeasures
for the stockpile. Congress advance-appropriated $5.6 billion
to the fund for use over 10 years (Fiscal Year (FY) 2004–2013;
the US government’s fiscal year (FY) starts on 1 October of
the previous year and extends to 30 September of the next
year. For example, FY 2007 starts on 1 October 2006 and
extends to 30 September 2007). In addition to the fund,
BioShield increased the authority and flexibility of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to develop the so-called
‘qualified countermeasures’ (a drug, biological product, or
device that the HHS Secretary determines as a priority) for
CBRN threats, and it permitted the use of medical treatments
not approved by the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) during an emergency.
5
BioShield set strict limits for how the government may
procure medical countermeasures. Before a contract is
awarded, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must
make a ‘material threat determination,’ to determine that
there is a significant threat to the US that warrants a
countermeasure. HHS must then evaluate the medical and
public health consequences of the specific threat, and
determine what medical countermeasures would be required
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and presidential approval may HHS award a BioShield
contract. To be eligible for an award, the government must
determine that the countermeasure will be available in
‘sufficient quantities’ and will be able to be licensed by the
FDA within eight years.
4 If the countermeasure is not
licensed at the time of delivery to the stockpile, the
government may opt to purchase the countermeasure at a
discounted price, with a bonus payable to the manufacturer
upon FDA licensure. The government may also opt to make
advance payments to the manufacturer before delivery, but if
the contract is canceled, those advance payments must be
repaid.
Project BioShield was intended to encourage industry to
develop medical countermeasures for CBRN threats, primar-
ily by creating a market for such products. Having a 10-year
fund specifically for procurement of countermeasures was
thought to be an incentive for industry, as it reduces the
usual year-by-year change in governmental appropriations
and political priorities.
6 However, even with this security, it
was generally felt that Project BioShield did not go far
enough to encourage industry participation in medical
countermeasure development, as shown by the small hand-
ful of countermeasures it has procured for the stockpile.
7
There are three important reasons for this:
BioShield does not support advanced development of medical
countermeasures
As BioShield is a late-stage procurement program for medical
countermeasures to be deposited in the stockpile, the
developer bore much of the financial and developmental
risk. Early development could be funded through NIH or
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants.
8 BioShield
could procure licensed countermeasures or countermeasures
that will likely be licensed within eight years; however,
advanced development steps between these two funding
mechanisms were not covered by government funding. This
gap in funding has been referred to as the ‘Valley of Death,’
and it has been a significant disincentive for industry
participation in the development of medical countermea-
sures against CBRN threats, particularly for small biotech-
nology companies, which could ill afford to pay for the gap
in funding.
5 In addition to being a burden on companies,
the Valley of Death was disadvantageous to the US govern-
ment. As BioShield funding could not contribute to the
preclinical stage of medical countermeasure development,
the government was forced to rely on market forces to
encourage the development of new products or technologies
that might eventually be procured under BioShield.
6
BioShield did not attract significant attention from large
pharmaceutical companies
When Project BioShield was signed into law, the Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
stated that they hoped for ‘procurement provisions that
more closely resemble the competitive private market in
which the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
ordinarily operate,’ which BioShield did not.
9 The funding
of $5.6 billion over 10 years was not seen as sufficient to
entice involvement of the larger pharmaceutical companies,
and selling a product for procurement to the US stockpile
was just not seen as attractive to industry as a product that
has recurring annual sales and a broader commercial
market.
6 The pharmaceutical companies’ experience in
developing and manufacturing medicines and vaccines,
and bringing them to market, was thus not available for
biodefense countermeasures.
BioShield contract uncertainties put developers at risk
Countermeasure developers faced not only the technical risk
that their products would fail in development, but also the
market risk that their products would not be procured under
BioShield, even if they were developed. While large biophar-
maceutical companies have been uninterested in entering
a market where the US government would be the sole
customer, some smaller biotechnology companies pursued
BioShield contracts, with varying success: the largest
BioShield contract awarded, $877 million contract to
VaxGen for the delivery of 75 million doses of rPA
(recombinant protective antigen) was canceled on 17
December 2006 for failure to meet a contract milestone.
10
In other cases, the HHS requests for proposals (RFPs) for
BioShield contracts have been canceled or delayed. Compa-
nies have not been given a clear path to produce counter-
measures, adding to the perception that developing
countermeasures is a market risk.
11,12
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act provisions
Title IV within the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act legislation, signed on 19 December 2006, was intended
to correct some of the shortcomings in BioShield. The Act
gave the HHS the ability to support advanced-stage research
and development (R&D) funding for medical countermea-
sures against CBRN threats, intending to bridge the Valley
of Death for countermeasure developers. It also gave HHS
authority to make milestone payments, among other con-
tracting authorities, to facilitate medical countermeasure
development by sharing the financial burden of develop-
ment with the manufacturers.
Specifically, the Act includes the following provisions:
2
Establishes the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority (BARDA)
BARDA is intended to facilitate collaboration among the US
government, relevant biopharmaceutical companies, and
academic researchers for the purpose of developing medical
countermeasures against CBRN threats. BARDA may bridge
the Valley of Death in medical countermeasure develop-
ment, because HHS can use its authorities to award
contracts, prizes, and other means to support activities
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BARDA will be exempt from certain Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) disclosure requirements for information that
‘reveals significant and not otherwise publicly known
vulnerabilities of existing medical or public health defenses.’
This exemption will be subject to review every five years, and
sunsets (terminates) after seven years.
Establishes the Biodefense Medical Countermeasure
Development Fund
There was $1.07 billion authorized for advanced develop-
ment funding, separate from the BioShield Special Reserve
Fund. The authorization included funds already committed
to advanced development programs, such as pandemic
influenza preparedness and medical countermeasure devel-
opment at NIH/National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID). However, as of this writing, no funds have
been appropriated for the BARDA development fund in
FY2008. The President’s FY2008 budget requests $189
million for the BARDA fund, but it is not yet clear what
will be appropriated by Congress.
Establishes the National Biodefense Science Board
Under the Act, the Board will ‘provide expert advice and
guidance to the Secretary on scientific, technical, and other
mattersy regarding current and future chemical, biological,
nuclear, and radiological agents, whether naturally occur-
ring, accidental, or deliberate. The board will consist of US
government officials, 4 representatives of the biopharma and
medical device industry, 4 academic representatives,
and 5 others including at least one practicing healthcare
professional and one representative of healthcare consu-
mers.’ The Act directs HHS to convene the first meeting of
the Board in December 2007 (this meeting took place on the
17–18 December 2007; a report can be found here: http://
www.hhs.gov/aspr/omsph/nbsb/). Working groups may also
be convened under the Board, to give advice to BARDA about
medical countermeasures. This may include identifying
innovative research for development by BARDA, or identify-
ing animal models or other research tools that could
accelerate countermeasure development.
Directs the FDA to provide technical assistance to the developers
of medical countermeasures on manufacturing and regulatory
processes
These FDA experts will provide countermeasure manufac-
turers with off-site and on-site assistance.
Gives HHS new authorities to expedite countermeasure
development, including expanded authorities for BioShield
The Act gives the Secretary of the HHS several new
authorities to promote the development and procurement
of medical countermeasures. These authorities include
the ability to award procurement contracts, grants, and
co-operative agreements; to select ‘other transactions’
authority (in addition to the usual authorities allowed under
the Federal Acquisitions Regulation
13) as well as to expedite
procurement authorities; to expedite to peer review; to offer
personal service contracts; to waive advance payment and
advertising requirements that govern US government con-
tracts; to make awards to foreign nationals; and to establish
research centers.
Most importantly, the Act specifies new BioShield contract
authorities to make milestone payments (ranging from 5 to
50% of the total contract amount), which do not have to be
repaid if the vendor fails to deliver finished product to the
stockpile. In addition, HHS may enter into exclusive sales
contracts, and may establish a ‘warm-base manufacturing’
capacity for a countermeasure, which means that there
would be a limited amount of annual production of the
countermeasure, which could be ramped up in a public
health emergency. The Secretary of HHS was also granted
some limited antitrust exemption authorities to facilitate
communication to improve the development of medical
countermeasures.
Challenges for implementation of the new
authorities
Managing ‘fixed’ and ‘flexible’ countermeasures
As the average drug or vaccine may take eight to 10 years to
develop, and cost upward of $800 million, developing and
stockpiling medical countermeasures against each CBRN
threat will require a great deal of time and money, and may
not be possible.
14,15 For example, there are 28 biological agents
in the 2006 DHS risk assessment that are thought to have
potential use in terrorism.
16 If factors such as antibiotic
resistance are considered in addition to these threats,
the number of potential threats expands further. Natural
biological agents will also certainly cause epidemics for which
no countermeasure existsFas SARS did in 2003Fand the
current methods for producing medical countermeasures are
insufficient to meet that need. In response to these concerns,
there have been calls for an alternative medical counter-
measure strategy to ‘one bug, one drug’ or ‘fixed’ defenses.
17–19
The alternative is a ‘flexible defense’ for medical counter-
measure development, which is now part of HHS’s mission:
BARDA is intended to promote ‘innovation to reduce the
time and cost of countermeasure y development’ as well as
improve the development of research tools, rapid diagnos-
tics, broad-spectrum antimicrobials, and vaccine technolo-
gies. The White House has also issued a directive (HSPD-18)
for a ‘broad-spectrum ‘flexible’ approach to address other
current and future [CBRN] threats’ in addition to defenses
against a finite number of ‘known or anticipated agents.’
20
This gives HHS a mandate to define operationally what a
flexible defense will entail for medical countermeasures
against CBRN threats.
HHS is not planning to abandon fixed defenses, which
they ‘determined to be effective and viable for some of the
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21 But
beyond the specific countermeasures that are of the highest
priority, HHS will be focusing efforts to develop and/
or acquire ‘broad-spectrum solutions using technologies
that enable more flexible next generation interventional
concepts.’
22
Flexible defense has not yet been defined operationally,
and the timelines for funding, developing, producing, and
prioritizing a flexible defense strategy remain unclear.
23
Much research will be required to realize the goal of an
effective antiviral arsenal, for example, and many relevant
technologies are in their infancy. HHS statements recognize
this and suggest that most flexible defense research will be
pursued by NIH, whose ‘long-term focus is on platform
technologies and broad-spectrum medical countermeasures
that will allow for the rapid introduction of additional
response capabilities for emerging infectious agents.’
24 In
addition to long timelines, HHS should consider how it will
prioritize investment in these technologies. For example, it
may be difficult to decide how funding for antiviral
mechanisms may be more or less important than funding
for new broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Engaging the biopharmaceutical industry to make
countermeasures
Before BARDA, there were too many reasons for biopharma-
ceutical companies to not want to participate in developing
and manufacturing CBRN countermeasures. In addition
to the structural disincentivesFsuch as the ‘Valley of
Death’FHHS actions have further discouraged industry
participation. A BioShield contract was canceled;
10 RFPs
have been canceled or delayed; and HHS has also been
faulted for not providing a clear path to companies that
would like to produce countermeasures.
11,12 It remains to be
seen if BARDA authorities will change this environment.
However, there is reason for optimism: there have been
several recent contracts awarded. On 4 June 2007, HHS
awarded a $500 million contract to Bavarian Nordic A/S
of Copenhagen, Denmark to deliver 20 million doses of a
‘next generation’ modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA) smallpox
vaccine, indicated for people with weakened immune
systems.
24 Bavarian Nordic will be the first BioShield
contract to allow for advanced payment under BioShield as
well as to provide milestone payments, authorized by the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
25 There have
also been several awards for anthrax countermeasures from
BARDA and NIAID: Elusys Therapeutics Inc. has been
awarded a $12 million contract for Anthim, an anthrax
therapeutic;
26 PharmAthene and Medarex were awarded
$13.9 million for development of Valortim, a monoclonal
antibody targeting anthrax protective antigen;
27 Emergent
BioSolutions was awarded contracts including up to $11.5
million in milestone payments to advance a postexposure
prophylaxis indication for BioThrax, the anthrax vaccine,
28
as well as a $9.5 million for nonclinical and clinical studies
of anthrax immune globulin.
29
HHS has also made recent efforts to communicate
more with the biopharmaceutical industry. They recently
published a strategy document and implementation plan
for medical countermeasure development,
22,24,30 they
launched a stakeholders web portal, held a stakeholders
workshop to get feedback on their plans in the summer
of 2007, and held a ‘BARDA Industry Day’ for companies
and stakeholders to demonstrate their technologies to HHS
personnel.
31
Adequate funding and tolerance of risk for developing
countermeasures
Developing drugs or vaccines is not only expensive, but
risky: more than 80% of pharmaceutical drugs in Phase I
development will eventually fail.
32 Given these realities, it is
likely that most CBRN countermeasures HHS will pursue will
fail, and they will cost a great deal of money. Because this
failure rate is well understood by industry, they require
incentives to participate in making medical countermeasures
for the US stockpile, such as rewards for milestones
compared with only rewarding finished products. However,
it is unclear whether the funders of the countermeasure
effortFthe US CongressFwill understand that only a small
portion of investments may succeed, and that each invest-
ment may be substantial. A concerted effort may be needed
to make the Congressional and other governmental leaders
understand the necessary risks associated with countermeasure
development, as well as the necessary scale of investment in
the nation’s medical countermeasure enterprise.
Conclusion
The US government has taken steps to develop a system to
procure medical countermeasures for CBRN threats, to
protect its citizens in the event of a public health emergency.
Without a commercial market to encourage the develop-
ment of the vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, and technologies
that are needed, the government has had to create a market,
and encourage commercial developers of medical counter-
measures to participate. Largely, it has done this through
Project BioShield, and now through the BARDA, created
through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
It is too early to tell whether BARDA will be successful in
its aims. However, the chance of its success will depend
a great deal on whether these authorities are funded
commensurate with their purpose, and in line with the
commercial market.
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